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After Personalism: Rethinking Power Transfers in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan 
What happens to the élites when the personalistic leader they supported for so long 
suddenly dies? This article tackles comparatively transitions out of first presidencies in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, presenting an analytical framework that seeks to explain 
why these transitions unfolded in relatively smooth fashion. The overall stability defining 
power transfer processes instigated by the non-violent death of personalistic rulers in 
both contexts is explained here through the intersection of three key factors: the regimes’ 
resort to succession practices consolidated in the Soviet era, the emergence of temporary 
forms of collective decision-making in both transitional contexts, and the 
implementation of de-personalisation strategies pursuing the obliteration of specific 
pockets of cadres but stopping short of wider regime re-organisation. The findings of this 
article contribute to broader debates on the politics of de-personalisation, while putting 
forward a comprehensive framework to analyse transitions out of personalism in and 
beyond post-Soviet Eurasia.  
Keywords: personalism; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; authoritarianism; leadership  
Introduction  
As “invincible autocrats” (Svolik 2012, 62), personalist rulers exert their power in 
unrestrained fashion, without apparent need for legislative or ideological justification 
(Chehabi & Linz 1998, 7), to ultimately dominate over trajectories and outcomes of the key 
mechanisms that operate in their political systems. These systems regularly evade collective 
decision-making, to engage in power representations that centre on the leader’s individual 
authority. 
Beyond power centralisation, authoritarian personalisation is normally operationalised 
through the establishment of extensive patron-client networks pivoting on the ruler (Baturo & 
Elkink 2016). As the weaker party in these networks, élites calculate that their adaptive 
capacity to the leader’s authoritarian agenda is essential to long-term political survival (Hale 
2005). Their contribution to the personalisation process is therefore limited to a peculiar form 
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of support, articulated through unwavering loyalty to, and unlimited compliance with, the 
leader’s persona and policies (Chehabi & Linz 1998, 12). The ultimate prize for such extreme 
loyalty is represented by the élites’ access to specific wealth distribution channels managed 
by the ruler’s inner circle through kleptocratic technologies of power (Acemoglu, Robinson 
& Verdier 2004). 
The élites’ positionality vis-à-vis the leader remains generally static throughout the 
evolution of personalistic rule, as the implementation of mercurial strategies of cadre 
management (Kailitz & Stockemer 2017, 338) continually feeds into the élites’ perception 
that proximity to the ruler is the only avenue to permanence in power (Roth 1968). There are 
nevertheless obvious biological limits to the perennial reproduction of these peculiar ruler-
élite relationships: what happens to the élites when the personalistic leader they supported for 
so long suddenly dies? 
While assessing through different criteria the impact exerted by the leader’s death 
upon the survival of personalist regimes, successive literature waves agreed in characterising 
such impact as a generally negative force vis-à-vis the long-term viability of personalist rule. 
Earlier works remarked that a leader’s death while in office has to be seen as a harbinger of 
instability for authoritarian polities more generally defined (Betts & Huntington 1985/86, 
141). Writing in the late 1990s, Barbara Geddes (1999, 132) noted that, after the completion 
of post-personalistic power transfers instigated by a leader’s death, the implementation of 
cadre management strategies pursuing rapid de-personalisation tends to erode the viability of 
personalistic authoritarianism, leading to regime decay and ensuing collapse. Jay Ulfelder 
(2005, 312) echoed Geddes’s argument, highlighting that it is the systematic “elimination of 
able potential rivals” to determine “why personalist regimes so seldom last longer than their 
founders”. More recent scholarship confirmed these views, remarking that the low degree of 
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institutionalisation that underpins the politics of personalism enhances regime instability 
following the leader’s passing (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz 2016, 161). 
The puzzle that guided the research showcased in this article centres on the 
identification and the discussion of the strategies whereby élites who flourished under 
personalism adjusted to the changes instigated by the death of the leader whom they had 
supported for more or less protracted time periods. This puzzle is tackled here by focusing on 
two case studies selected from the wide panoply of authoritarian practices existing across 
post-Soviet Eurasia. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
transitions out of personalistic presidencies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan proceeded in 
relatively smooth fashion and, in the medium-term, the post-personalistic regimes emerged 
from the deaths of Saparmurat A. Niyazov and Islam A. Karimov came to enjoy relative 
stability. As these findings deviate quite markedly from the chaotic representation of post-
personalism evoked by the extant literature, the article’s core argument contends that, in the 
contexts examined here, the orderly completion of transitions out of personalism is 
explainable through two specific factors: the return to Soviet political practices to regulate 
post-Soviet political processes, and the emergence, during the transitional processes, of 
consequential, albeit temporary, practices of collective decision-making that were redundant 
before the leader’s passing. In developing a secondary line of argument, this article will also 
make the case for the emergence of managed de-personalisation pathways in both 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, attributing a key role in post-transitional regime maintenance 
to the personnel policies carried out after leadership succession had been completed. 
Scholarly debates on personalism and personalist rule have so far delved into the 
systematisation of regime personalisation dynamics or focused on the factors contributing to 
the entrenchment of personalistic rule (Roth 1968; Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Chehabi & Linz 
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1998; Geddes 1999; Slater 2003; Acemoglu, Robinson & Verdier 2004; Guliyev 2011; 
Baturo & Elkink 2016). Not much attention has been conversely devoted to patterns of 
regime de-personalisation surfaced in the immediate aftermath of a leader’s death. It is 
precisely within this literature gap that the present study intends to place its key findings. 
To illustrate its findings, this article brings forward an appositely tailored analytical 
framework that is comparative in outlook, agency-centred, and underpinned by a multi-
phased and methodologically diverse research agenda. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are relevant to the study of post-personalism as both 
countries experienced protracted periods of personalistic rule and witnessed the successful 
completion of power transfer processes set into motion by the non-violent deaths of 
personalistic presidents, namely S.A. Niyazov, who ruled Turkmenistan from independence 
until his death in December 2006, and I.A. Karimov, whose long term in office extended 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union to his passing in August 2016. Relevant Area Studies 
literature has agreed in analysing under the personalistic rubric the forms of authoritarianism 
consolidated in Turkmenistan under Niyazov (Bohr 2003; Anceschi 2009; Polese & Horák 
2015; Koch 2016) and Uzbekistan under Karimov (Kangas 2003; March 2003; Ilkhamov 
2007; Markowitz 2012). 
The theory advancement agenda pursued by this article recognises that case study 
selection has resulted in the investigation of political dynamics emerged from relatively 
similar contexts. As the article will unveil a set of minimal differences between the two 
transitions studied here, however, the observation of similar cases becomes instrumental to a 
discussion of authoritarian diffusion dynamics in post-personalistic landscapes (Brinks & 
Coppedge 2006; Ambrosio 2010; Lankina, Libman & Obydenkova 2016). This latter 
proposition establishes that the two succession processes examined here are ultimately not 
independent, as, in late 2016, the Uzbek élites re-interpreted, and in some sense perfected, the 
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succession praxis established almost a decade earlier by the Turkmen regime, which, in turn, 
borrowed heavily from the Soviet authoritarian playbook to extricate itself from the political 
conundrums raised by Niyazov’s sudden death.  
In addition to establishing “institutionless polities” (Jackson & Rosberg 1982, 8) in 
both landscapes, protracted personalistic rule limited the range and relevance of the actors 
involved in regime politics under Niyazov and Karimov. Extra-familial élites constituted 
therefore the sole protagonist of the transitions instigated by the deaths of the two leaders. 
The article—and its first section more in particular—acknowledges this centrality and, when 
delving into the political processes that steered the transfer of power in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, is committed to grant quasi exclusive analytical attention to élite members. This 
approach, incidentally, echoes Vladimir Gel’man’s suggestion to locate actors at the 
epicentre of any investigation of regime trajectories in post-Soviet Eurasia (Gel’man 2018, 
286-290). Élite politics are interpreted throughout this study as the bellwether for the micro-
logics behind the de-personalisation of Turkmen and Uzbek politics as carried out after the 
completion of the two leadership change processes.  
To investigate these processes, the article articulates its empirical agenda around two 
distinct timeframes. A very short-term approach is initially required to sketch out patterns of 
de-personalisation emerged in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan across the brief transitional 
periods—56 days in the former case, 109 days in the latter—bookended by the death of a 
leader on the one hand and the accession to power of their successor on the other. These 
patterns are described in the article’s second segment, which looks comparatively at the two 
power transfer mechanisms in question, rounding off the primary evidence extracted from the 
regime press published in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with accounts of the transitions 
that appeared in Eurasian and Western media. This section of the article pursues a dual end. It 
captures at first the short interval of collective decision-making wherein élites defied the lack 
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of structural and institutional succession arrangements to coalesce around viable successors 
to both Niyazov and Karimov. It also, and perhaps most importantly, attempts a 
systematisation of the power transfer praxis consolidated in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
designing an analytical model that has wider implications for transitions out of personalistic 
regimes across the wider Asian political space. 
A medium-term approach is in turn required to reveal how de-personalisation was 
sustained by the two regimes ruling over post-transitional Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This 
end is pursued analytically in the article’s third segment, which studies the élite management 
strategies at play in the early post-personalistic eras, scrutinising the career patterns of the 79 
cadres who alternated in central and peripheral positions of power throughout the two years 
that followed the establishment of post-personalistic presidencies in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
While the persistence of shared Soviet legacies defines its significance in relation to 
succession dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia—particularly in authoritarian systems where 
post-personalistic transitions are expected to occur imminently (Tajikistan) or are due at a 
later stage (Russia, Belarus)—the succession model outlined in this article is also intended as 
a contribution to germane scholarly debates on the transfer of power in non-postcommunist 
Asia. As a micro-level argument to the study of regime change and continuity, this article 
examines three specific casual mechanisms—the return of succession practices from prior 
political eras, the emergence of interim collective decision-making, and the selective use of 
post-transition purges—which may offer a viable framework to delve into transitions to be 
initiated in authoritarian systems featuring more or less visible personalistic tendencies, and 
Cambodia more in particular (Heder 2005; Morgenbesser 2018). At the same time, this paper 
intends to build an analytical bridge between the orderly transitions in post-personalist 
Central Asia and the authoritarian playbook of pre-Xi Jinping’s China, where the same end—
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smooth transfer of power—was pursued through essentially different means—carefully 
planned mechanisms of pre-arranged succession (Nathan 2003). 
 
 
The Context for Collective Decision-Making  
The absence of a designated successor is not an uncommon feature of contemporary 
authoritarianism. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the leaderships’ failure to set up pre-
determined succession arrangements is explainable through the presidents’ inability to 
instigate political succession on a familial basis and their protracted reluctance to designate a 
successor from within the ranks of their supporting élites. For different reasons, the option to 
set into motion mechanisms of familial succession was unavailable to both Niyazov and 
Karimov. The Uzbek leader missed the biological opportunity to orchestrate father-son 
succession, while Niyazov’s son, Murat, harboured no political ambition throughout his adult 
life. The presidents’ failure to elevate their daughters to power prominence appeared in turn 
linked to specificities intrinsic to the two political contexts in question. Incidentally, the 
contextualisation of the limited prospects for dynastic succession in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan clarifies ex post that the regimes led by Niyazov and Karimov were never entirely 
sultanistic, as they failed to develop a visible nexus between personalism and dynasticism—
the core element of sultanistic rule as defined by Chehabi and Linz (1998, 13). 
The designation of non-familial successors seemed at the same time a political praxis 
disconnected from the modus operandi of both Niyazov and Karimov, who therefore 
addressed their respective crown-prince problems (Brownlee 2007) in an identical fashion. 
Turkmenistan’s personalistic rule was defined by unitary conceptualisations and 
representations of power, which, in the views of Turkmen official propaganda and the central 
regime more in general, had to reside exclusively in the presidential persona. Throughout his 
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15 years at the helm, Niyazov categorically refused to share the political limelight with other 
cadres, marginalising any élite member who, due to accrued expertise or rising popularity, 
had the potential to overshadow him. Conspiracy theories notwithstanding,1 the selection of a 
post-personalistic leader from the very margins of Turkmenistan’s political élite appears a 
transitional outcome thoroughly consistent with the power conceptualisation underpinning 
Niyazovism: the accession to power of Gurbanguly M. Berdymukhammedov—a virtually 
unknown, albeit very established, cadre—responded in full to exclusionary personnel policies 
designed to obstruct the rise of power centres disconnected from the president. 
So far as Uzbekistan’s non-familial succession, the longstanding association2 between 
Karimov and Shavkat M. Mirziyoyev confirms on the one hand the latter leader’s centrality 
in the Karimovist power system, yet it fails to constitute on the other an unequivocal signal of 
the late president’s intention to openly designate Uzbekistan’s long-term prime minister as 
his apparent successor.  
                                                 
1 In the months that followed Niyazov’s death, global media continued to report the rumour—which 
remains unverified at the time of writing of this article—that identified president Berdymukhammedov 
as Saparmurat Niyazov’s illegitimate son. Based on the alleged physical resemblance between the two 
leaders, these rumours were still circulating 12 months after Niyazov’s demise (see, for instance, the 
BBC profile of G.M. Berdymukhammedov appeared on 21 December 2007, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6346185.stm, accessed 13 February 2019), and even 
made their way into respectable academic analyses of contemporary Asian dynasticism (Monday 2011, 
825). 
2 The Karimov-Mirziyoyev axis had consolidated well before the latter’s accession to the highest 
echelons of Uzbekistan’s central élites, which was completed through his appointment as Prime 
Minister in December 2003. Lawrence Markowitz (2012, 398) noted that the two regions governed by 
Mirziyoyev—Jizzakh (1996-2001) and Samarkand (2001-2003)—received above-average funding 
throughout his tenure, in a further confirmation of the high regard in which his work was held by 
Uzbekistan’s central government.  
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There is therefore no evidence to maintain that Niyazov and Karimov appointed, at 
any stage during their presidencies, their respective successors: the argument articulated in 
this article diverges from speculative views on presidential attitudes towards succession 
arrangements in Central Asia (Ambrosio 2015), aligning to the conclusions advanced by Eric 
McGlinchey (2016, 212-214) so far as the region’s dynamics of authoritarian succession.  
The specificity of the forms of personalistic rule developed in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan delimitates further the range of actors involved in the two power transfer 
mechanisms studied here. The leaders’ political parties—Türkmenistanyň Demokratik 
Partiýasy [Democratic Party of Turkmenistan]; O'zbekiston Liberal-demokratik Partiyasi 
[Liberal-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan]—played essentially cosmetic roles in Turkmen and 
Uzbek politics, and did not rise to the position of hegemonic power assigned to authoritarian 
party structures elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (Bader 2011, 194-195). Niyazov and 
Karimov never intended to transform their parties into vessels for the establishment of power-
sharing deals and the articulation of intra-party forms of designated succession (Magaloni 
2008). 
Due to the intensely authoritarian undertone of Turkmen and Uzbek politics, non-
regime actors were prevented from contributing in any direct or indirect way to the power 
transfer mechanisms instigated by the deaths of first presidents in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The regimes’ persistent work of authoritarian control eviscerated internal dissent, 
while extreme fragmentation condemned in turn the opposition-in-exile to protracted 
irrelevance. 
As the strands of personalism consolidated in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
lacked designated successors, strong party structures to cultivate future leaders, and an 
opposition able to offer alternative solutions to mere regime continuity, Jason Brownlee’s 
fundamental question (“Who will form the next generation of leaders in countries where 
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autocracy persists?” [Brownlee 2007, 627]) becomes relevant to intents and purposes of this 
study insofar as it directs our attention onto the cadres who supported Niyazov and Karimov 
throughout their time in office. 
Explaining these post-personalistic transitions through the arrangements overtly or 
covertly made by the élites in Ashgabat and Tashkent highlights a first set of continuities 
with the succession praxis consolidated in the Soviet Union. The power transfer mechanisms 
completed in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan unfolded in a noticeably Brezhnevian context, 
defined on the one hand by the leaders’ unwillingness to delineate contours and terms of their 
political succession and, on the other, the consequential domination of a stagnating ruling 
class over the power transfer process. The latter feature holds exclusive relevance for 
Uzbekistan’s post-personalistic transition. In the Soviet Union, the self-stabilising élites of 
the Khrushchev era (Rigby 1970) receded to the “ossified oligarchy” (Bialer 1978, 186) of 
the 1970s and early 1980s (Willerton 1987): Islam Karimov implemented similar personnel 
policies, allowing long tenures to key cadres in order to reduce the size and outreach capacity 
of the patronage networks emanating from his principal allies (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2014, 48-52). 
The Niyazovist élite was conversely managed through erratic strategies pursuing the 
precariousness of cadres: extremely high turnover rates and the simultaneous reshuffle of 
multiple cadres at central and regional level defined in unequivocal terms how 
Turkmenistan’s personalistic leader engaged with his supporting élites throughout his 15 
years in power (Kunysz 2012). 
Ultimately, the structural demarcation of the two power transfer processes in question 
coincides analytically with the first prong of Richard Snyder’s mapping of post-sultanistic 
transitions, namely that which is centred on ruler-state relations (Snyder 1998, 53-55). 
Through the extreme degree of institutional penetration achieved by both Niyazov and 
Karimov, Turkmen and Uzbek personalisms came to be defined by an intimate fusion of 
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regime and state, in which virtually no political space was granted to regime soft-liners and 
peripheral élite members were forced to play essentially passive roles. The absence of a 
designated successor obliterated the individual dimension of post-personalistic transitions in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: these political processes shaped up as a collective interval 
pursuing the de-personalisation of decision-making. 
Succession is understood throughout this article in the way Valerie Bunce did, not as 
a mere “replacement of governing officials, but rather as a complex process which alters the 
policy environment in certain ways and, perhaps, policy priorities as well” (Bunce 1981, 16). 
The momentary shift between the individualised decision-making praxis underpinning 
personalist rule and the invisibly collective approaches that defined post-personalistic 
transitions in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has to be seen as the most evident amongst the 
policy environment alterations instigated by the deaths of Niyazov and Karimov. 
In acknowledging the existence of such collective, yet unwaveringly authoritarian, 
decision-making milieux, this article recognises that, in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the 
absence of adequate norms, structures and practices to regulate post mortem passages of 
power was overcome through the crystallisation of informal political groupings determining 
trajectories and outcomes of post-personalistic transitions. A correct appraisal of the size of 
the winning coalitions remains a problematic issue in the application of Selectorate Theory 
(Bueno de Mesquita, Smith & Siverson 2003, 37-76) to non-democratic contexts (Gallagher 
& Hanson 2015). It has been however assumed that personalistic regimes normally feature 
very small winning coalitions, “typically a tiny cadre of fiercely loyal cronies” (Pickering & 
Kisangani 2010, 480). This latter proposition is validated empirically by the research 
showcased in the next paragraphs, which discuss size, membership, and roles of the winning 
coalitions operating in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan after the deaths of first presidents. 
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When first presidents die: Mechanics of power transfer in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
Two noticeable differences come to the fore when we approach comparatively the internal 
facets of the power transfer mechanisms set into motion by the death of personalistic leaders 
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One is directly related to the regimes’ reaction times to the 
demise of first presidents. Different reaction times to a leader’s death indicate different levels 
of regime preparedness to deal with internal rifts before embarking upon fully-fledged 
processes of leadership change. This connexion—which bears key implications for power 
transfers in non-democratic environments, where established succession praxes are either 
unavailable to, or systematically ignored by, the ruling élites—surfaced most famously in the 
aftermath of Stalin’s death, which remains the archetypal case of chaotic post-personalistic 
succession (Fitzpatrick 2015, 220-223). 
News of Niyazov’s death began to circulate on 21 December 2006, as Turkmen 
official media reported that the president had passed on overnight (Pannier 2006). The 
government in Tashkent waited more than a week to announce the demise of Uzbekistan’s 
first president, which was not acknowledged until 2 September 2016.3 Uzbekistan’s power 
transfer set on in a challenging environment: a 8-day interval between the president’s actual 
passing and the public acknowledgement of Karimov’s death was necessary to settle intra-
élite scores and determine the role of the first family in the Uzbek succession—a thorny issue 
that, conversely, played no role in the apparently smoother Turkmen leadership transition, 
which was instigated by the death of a personalistic leader holding very loose familial links. 
                                                 
3 It has been possible to confirm the exact date of Islam Karimov’s death (27 August 2016) only in late 
July 2017, on the basis of news reporting that some of Uzbekistan’s most prominent political and 
religious leaders had gathered in Tashkent to hold a memorial dinner for the late president, in 
observation of a Uzbek tradition that stipulates similar commemorations to be held 11 months from the 
exact day of the deceased’s departure (Pannier 2017). 
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A further difference between the power transfer processes studied here relates to the 
career backgrounds of the cadres selected to succeed the first presidents. Both selected 
presidents were regime insiders, although they wielded significantly different amounts of 
power at the time of their selection to interim leadership. The relatively unknown G.M. 
Berdymukhammedov, Turkmenistan’s long-term minister for Health & Pharmaceutical 
Industry, was a deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers at the time of Niyazov’s death; 
Sh.M. Mirziyoyev, one of Uzbekistan’s most visible politicians beyond Karimov, had 
occupied the post of Uzbekistan’s prime minister since December 2003. Despite their long-
term experience as regime insiders, the two selected cadres were nevertheless relatively 
young4 at the time of their elevation to the interim leaderships. It seems that the winning 
coalitions did not intend to deliberately shorten the length of second-generation presidencies 
by appointing ageing leaders, discarding in this sense the option to establish strategic 
gerontocracies (Magni Berton & Panel 2015) in post-personalistic Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The accession to power of younger cadres departs incidentally from the post-
Brezhnev succession praxis, which, between the early 1980s and M.S Gorbachëv’s rise to 
power (11 March 1985), saw the consecutive appointment of elderly leaders (Yu.V. 
Andropov, K.U. Chernenko) to the General Secretaryship of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. 
If the internal facets of the succession mechanisms completed in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan evolved in somehow diverging trajectories, their outward dimensions featured a 
series of striking similarities. Of these, the most important is certainly represented by the 
regimes’ re-appropriation of Soviet political rituals to publicly announce the identity of the 
                                                 
4 Born on 29 June 1957, G.M. Berdymukhammedov was just under 50 years old when appointed to 
Turkmenistan’s interim presidency. S.M. Mirziyoyev (born on 24 July 1957) rose to Uzbekistan’s 
interim presidency at the age of 59. 
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selected leader. The Soviet praxis of the 1980s saw the successive deaths of L.I. Brezhnev, 
Andropov and Chernenko instigating consecutive transitions that invariably culminated in the 
accession to supreme power of the cadre who headed the funeral commission (Brown 1984). 
In line with this tradition, both Berdymukhammedov and Mirziyoyev acted as the first 
signatories of obituaries appeared on state media5 and were appointed to chair the ad hoc 
commissions6 tasked to organise the funerals of Niyazov and Karimov respectively. The re-
appropriation of Soviet rituals to regulate post-Soviet power transfers may be regarded as a 
practical choice—both élites made use of readily available political tools featuring a 
demonstrable degree of effectiveness—and as an indicator that complex processes of 
authoritarian learning were at play in both post-Niyazov’s Turkmenistan—where the élites 
looked at authoritarian practices consolidated in prior historical eras to address pressing 
political issues—and post-Karimov Uzbekistan, where the regime perfected in turn the 
mechanism of post-personalist transition devised in Turkmenistan in the aftermath of the 
death of its first president. 
                                                 
5 For S.A. Niyazov’s obituary, see: “Saparmurat Turkmenbashi Velikii” [Saparmurat Turkmenbashi 
The Great], Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, 22 December 2006, p. 1. For I.A. Karimov’s obituary, see: 
“Prezident Republiki Uzbekistana Islam Abduganevich Karimov” [The President of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan Islam Abduganevich Karimov], UzA, 3 September 2016. 
6 In line with the process of élite militarisation intervened in 2002-2006, the organisation of the funeral 
for S.A. Niyazov was performed by the Committee for the National Security of Turkmenistan, as 
officially confirmed in: “Reshenie Gosudarstvennogo soveta bezopasnosti Turkmenistana i Kabineta 
Ministrov Turkmenistana” [Joint Resolution of the State Security Committee and the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Turkmenistan], Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, 22 December 2006, p. 1. For information on the 
funeral commission established in Uzbekistan after Karimov’s death, see: “O sozdanii gosudarstvennoi 
Komisii po organizatskii pokhoron pervogo Presidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan I.A. Karimova” [On the 
Establishment of a State Commission to Organise the Funeral of the First President of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan I.A. Karimov], UzA, 2 September 2016. 
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A set of carefully crafted political rituals articulated the evolution of the mechanisms 
whereby the demise of first presidents resulted in the establishment of post-personalistic 
regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. To assess the influence exerted by key structural 
differences on these processes’ timelines, this article analyses the two power transfers in 
question through a multi-phased approach, which is captured graphically by Figure 1. 
 
Please insert Figure 1 HERE 
 
The designating phase of the power transfer mechanisms completed in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan encompassed a brief interval of collective decision-making bookended by the 
death of personalistic leaders on the one hand and the selection of interim presidents on the 
other. In this phase, two winning coalitions—smaller élite groups formed by top central 
cadres and military leaders of the highest rank—surfaced to wield unchallenged influence 
over the very opaque processes of intra-élite bargaining that culminated in the appointment of 
post-personalistic leaders. The existence of these informal yet powerful groupings is 
juxtaposed here with outer élite groupings, a broader range of subordinates who intervened at 
a later transitional stage to participate in regime processes formalising, through a series of 
impeccably staged political rituals, the establishment of fully-fledged presidencies. 
While there is no absolute certainty so far as the exact composition of the two 
winning coalitions, this article managed to delineate with some degree of precision the 
contours of the inner groups overseeing presidential successions in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. Combining insights included in media reports from the Eurasian region7 with 
                                                 
7 “Turkmeniya perebiraet preemnikov Niyazova” [Turkmenistan Selects Niyazov’s Successor], 
Izvestiya, 25 December 2006; “Turkmeniya: Akmurad Redzhepov pal zhertvoi rezhima, kotoryi on sam 
i postroil” [Turkmenistan: Akmurad Redzhepov, A Victim to a Regime that he himself Helped 
Building], Fergana.ru, 31 July 2017.  
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more systematic studies authored by European scholars (Peyrouse 2012, 108-110; Horák 
2012, 307-309; Bohr 2016, 10-13), it may be suggested that the outcome of the post-Niyazov 
transition was brokered by Akmammed Rakhmanov (minister of interior) and Akmurad 
Rezhepov (head of the presidential guard). As representatives of Turkmenistan’s very 
influential power structures, these two cadres wielded at the time enough influence to impose 
their succession plans upon longstanding members of the political élite and prominent 
personnel from Turkmenistan’s military and para-military sectors. 
The composition of the winning coalition at work in Uzbekistan between late August 
and early September 2016 is somehow less contested. Western and Eurasian media agreed8 
on the emergence of a supreme triumvirate—comprising Prime Minister Mirziyoyev, Deputy 
Prime Minister Ruslan Azimov, and SNB head Rustam Inoyatov—which assumed 
prominence in the resolution of the leadership transition instigated by the death of Islam 
Karimov. This tripartite grouping embodied an alliance between established central cadres 
(Mirziyoyev, Azimov) and Inoyatov, who headed Uzbekistan’s National Security Service for 
more than twenty years. 
Two fundamental observations arise from this contextualisation of the two winning 
coalitions. The first relates to the leaders’ power differential, which is identified here as the 
direct function of their position vis-à-vis the two groups that selected second-generation 
presidents. At the time of Niyazov’s death, Berdymukhammedov was situated in a position of 
peripheral influence in relation to the Turkmen élite. Selected for presidential succession as 
the compromise candidate, he was therefore external to the winning coalition: his rise to 
power was conditional to the strength and durability of the alliances that he managed to forge 
with winning coalition members and their immediate supporters. As a cadre who was 
                                                 
8 “Uzbek leader sacks powerful security boss”, Reuters, 31 January 2018. See also, Medvedev 2017.  
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conversely situated at the core of the élite ensemble that supported president Karimov until 
his death, Mirziyoyev was internal to the restricted grouping that determined the outcome of 
Uzbekistan’s post-personalistic transition. The new Uzbek leader was able to negotiate his 
rise to power directly with other winning coalition members, who had as a consequence 
limited capacity to constrain his agenda throughout the power transfer mechanism. 
Emphasis on the successors’ positionality vis-à-vis the winning coalitions as well the 
wider élites suggests in turn that élite pacts emerged as fundamental determinants for the 
success of the post-personalistic power transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the 
former case, the pact between Rakhmanov and Rezhepov elevated Berdymukhammedov to 
power, marginalising Agageldi Mammetgeldiyev, Turkmenistan’s minister of defence at time 
of Niyazov’s death. Turkmen opposition sources9 reported that Mammetgeldiyev emerged as 
a key contender for the presidency during the short transition, suggesting that his relationship 
with Redzhepov deteriorated quite dramatically after the latter had supported 
Berdymukhammedov as Niyazov’s successor. The Uzbek transition revolved around the pact 
negotiated between Mirziyoyev and Inoyatov during the turbulent week that followed 
Karimov’s death. We are led to believe that Inoyatov extended his support to Uzbekistan’s 
second president in exchange for a negotiated exit from the Uzbek élite (Medvedev 2017). 
Inoyatov’s transactional approach to leadership selection was confirmed retrospectively by a 
series of developments that unfolded after 30 January 2018, the date of his official dismissal 
from the chairmanship of the SNB. Beyond his eventual appointment to the Uzbek Senate,10 
                                                 
9 “Turkmen Security Chief Ousted”, Gündogar, 17 May 2007, available at: 
http://gundogar.org/?0220044318000000000000013000000, accessed 20 February 2019.  
10 Appointed to the Senate by presidential decree shortly after his dismissal form the SNB, R.R. 
Inoyatov remains, at the time of writing, one of the 15 senators whose Senate seats were object of direct 
presidential nomination. The complete list is available on the official website of the Uzbek Senate, 
http://senat.uz/ru/senators/region/15\, accessed 25 February 2019.  
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Inoyatov was also guaranteed immunity from prosecution of crimes committed while in post 
and, at a later stage, became part of Mirziyoyev’s new presidential administration, wherein 
was nominated as the president’s key advisor on national security.  
The second point arising from this investigation of the two winning coalitions 
suggests a relationship of indirect causality between the élite policy implemented by the 
departed leaders in the later stages of their rule and the outcome of post-personalistic 
successions. Borrowing from Peter Frank, writing in 1987 about Soviet mechanisms of 
political succession, a new leader may be said to be “put in place by his predecessor’s team—
he inherits a government, rather than creates a new one” (92). As the fulcrum of wide 
patronage networks emanating personalistic authority over central and peripheral institutions, 
the ageing rulers left indelible imprints over the formation of these élites, exerting in this 
sense a modicum of incidental influence over the transitions themselves.  
Turkmenistan’s winning coalition emerged as an informal body that included two 
members, both operating within the power structures of the Turkmen state. This 
characterisation highlights a relationship of direct continuity between Turkmenistan’s post-
personalistic transition and the élite policies of the late Niyazov era (2002-2006), when 
power ministries and military structures progressively expanded their influence over 
Turkmenistan’s domestic decision-making processes. At the same time, the identification of 
Uzbekistan’s winning coalition as a tripartite grouping including established members of the 
political élite and influential representatives of the secret services mirrored the stagnating 
cadre structure of the late Karimov era, which witnessed the unrelenting expansion of the 
influence exerted by Uzbekistan’s power structures over medium-ranked central personnel 
and regional cadres of all levels. 
Official announcements informing the wider population about the establishment of 
funeral commissions to honour the deceased leader represented the exact political moment in 
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which the designating stages of the two power transfer processes studied here had reached a 
successful completion. These commissions, as we have seen before, were chaired by the 
cadre emerging victorious from the appointment process, who also became the country’s 
interim leader and, in both contexts, came to be universally recognised as the president in 
pectore. 
The linearity of the Turkmen power transfer mechanism allowed the regime to 
announce the death of its personalistic leader while simultaneously revealing the identity of 
Niyazov’s élite-designated successor. Turkmenistan’s 2006-2007 transition experienced in 
this sense a very brief designating phase, wherein the dictates of the Turkmen constitution 
were systematically ignored. Article 60 of the constitutional draft in force at the time of 
Niyazov’s demise stipulated that, in case of death of incapacitation of a sitting president, the 
speaker of the Majlis (the Turkmen Parliament) was to be elevated to a position of temporary 
leadership.11 Shortly after Niyazov’s death, Ovezgeldy Ataev, Turkmenistan’s parliamentary 
speaker since November 2002, was arrested and imprisoned amidst forged accusations of 
abuse of authority and immoral conduct, thus paving the way for the appointment of 
Berdymukhammedov to Turkmenistan’s interim leadership. Ataev was not freed until early 
2012.12 
                                                 
11 For the full Russian-language text of the Turkmen Constitution in force in late 2006, see Neitral’nyi 
Turkmenistan, 20 August 2003, p. 2. Article 60 was modified shortly after Berdymukhammedov’s 
appointment to the interim leadership. The new provisions—included in Article 58 of the constitution 
amended on 27 December 2006—stipulated that the “temporary fulfilment of the duties of the President 
of Turkmenistan […] is entrusted to one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Cabinet of Ministers”, in a 
concerted attempt to bestow retroactive legitimacy upon the appointment of the new Turkmen leader. 
The Russian-language text of the post-2006 Turkmen Constitution can be consulted at: Neitral’nyi 
Turkmenistan, 27 September 2008, p. 6. 




While it evolved throughout a relatively longer timeframe, the designating stage of 
the post-Karimov transition similarly bypassed Uzbekistan’s constitutional dictates. 
Nigmatilla T. Yuldashev—the cadre who, in his capacity as chairman of the Uzbek senate, 
was constitutionally13 entitled to lead the transition—was however not forcibly removed from 
the presidential succession, as he publicly14 called for Mirziyoyev to acquire interim 
presidential powers. Yuldashev’s voluntary relinquishment of his constitutional duties did not 
however occur until 8 September 2016, almost a week after the announcement of Islam 
Karimov’s death. Incidentally, this cooperative attitude helped Yuldashev’s career: at the 
time of writing, he continues to chair the Uzbek Senate, the position he occupied at the end of 
the Karimov era. 
The disclosure of the identity of second-generation leaders certified a triple evolution 
in the nature of the power transfer mechanisms studied here. First, it sealed the conclusion of 
the brief interlude wherein the transition from personalistic rule to hyper-authoritarian 
presidencies came to be dealt with through collective élite approaches. Cadre appointments to 
interim presidential posts, moreover, ushered in the most public phase of the power transfer 
processes set into motion by the death of first presidents in both Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The opening of the transitions’ ceremonial phase finally moved the post-
                                                 
13 An annotated electronic draft of the Uzbek constitution, here consulted in its Russian language 
version, is available at: http://www.lex.uz/acts/35869 , accessed 30 January 2019. 
14 On 8 September 2016, during a joint meeting of the Oliy Majlis—the lower chamber of the Uzbek 
Parliament—and the Senate, Yuldashev argued in favour of elevating Mirziyoyev to Uzbekistan’s 
interim presidency, on the basis of his “many years of experience in senior positions of public authority 
and management, and the respect [he enjoyed] amongst the population”. The full account of this joint 
meeting is published in: “Informatsionnye sluzhby Zakonodatel’noi palaty i Senata Olii Mazhlisa 
Respubliki Uzbekistan” [Information Service of the Legislative Assembly and the Senate of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan], Narodnoe Slovo, 9 September 2016, p. 1. 
 22 
personalist transitions in question away from the realm of political informality, leading them 
into a more ritualised phase of their own evolution. 
Critical to the effective advancement of this second transitional phase is an outer élite 
grouping, which was tasked to play central roles in the heavily ritualised culmination of the 
two post-personalist power transfers in question. As it unfolded through a series of public 
events, this ritualisation facilitated an exact reconstruction of the membership of these larger 
élite ensembles. 
Three milestone events defined the transitions’ ceremonial phases: the 
commemoration of the deceased leaders, the organisation of nation-wide campaigns that led 
to presidential votes in Turkmenistan (11 February 2007) and Uzbekistan (4 December 
2016), and the official ceremonies that inaugurated the post-personalist presidencies after 
Berdymukhammedov and Mirziyoyev had enjoyed their respective electoral triumphs. 
Presidential funerals set early benchmarks towards the conclusion of the power 
transfer mechanisms studied here. As spectacular events critical to post-personalistic 
succession, the commemorations of deceased leaders represented the conclusive element in 
the longstanding cults of the first presidents’ personalities, the “fountainhead of authority” 
(Paltiel 1983, 50) for their respective political systems and a defining marker of the specific 
forms of personalism consolidated in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan throughout the post-
Soviet years (Chehabi & Linz 1998, 13-15). In both cases, interim leaders played marginal 
roles in the commemoration of first presidents: these funerals can be therefore regarded as 
episodes of posthumous personalism. 
As largely staged political events, the presidential elections that formalised the 
accession to power of post-personalistic leaders in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
contributed directly to the process of political ritualisation defining the latter phases of the 
two power transfer mechanisms studied here. Although their selection as interim leaders 
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guaranteed unchallenged access to the presidency and its powers, both Berdymukhammedov 
and Mirziyoyev opted to stage presidential elections that, ignoring any international standard 
of fairness and openness,15 came to be reduced to plebiscites for the two second-generation 
leaders.  
These two votes were conducted through strikingly similar regime strategies. On the 
one hand, no member of either the winning coalition or the outer élite groupings ran as a 
candidate against the interim presidents.16 The non-competitive nature of transitional votes in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—already guaranteed by the failure to involve any candidate 
expressed by opposition forces—was therefore enhanced by the regime’s choice to have 
marginal élite members running alongside the interim presidents. On the other, both 
Berdymukhammedov and Mirziyoyev interpreted high turnout rates and plebiscitary 
percentages of favourable votes17 through the Soviet political lens, which regarded inflated 
                                                 
15 In departure from the isolationist praxis established by both prior regimes, the first post-transitional 
presidential elections were either partially (Turkmenistan) of fully (Uzbekistan) monitored by OSCE 
observers. For the results of the monitoring missions, which expressed similar concerns about the 
overall fairness of these votes, see: OSCE/ODIHR, Turkmenistan, Presidential Election, 11 February 
2007: Needs Assessment Mission Report, 19 January 2007; OSCE/ODIHR, Uzbekistan, Early 
Presidential Election, 4 December 2016: Final Report, 22 March 2007.  
16 Beside interim leader Berdymukhammedov, the other five candidates running for the presidential 
elections of 12 February 2007 were: A. Atadzhikov, first deputy hakim of the Tashauz velayat (region); 
M.S. Gurbanov, governor of the Karabekevyul province (Lebap velayat); O. Karadzhaev, mayor of 
Abadan (Ahal region); I. Nuryev, deputy minister for Oil and Gas; A.A. Pomanov, mayor of the city of 
Turkmenbashi (Balkan velayat). Reflecting Uzbekistan’s fictional pluralism, the presidential election 
of December 2016 was contested by Kh. Ketmonov (People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan); S.S. 
Otamuradov (Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party); N.M. Umarov (Justice Social 
Democratic Party). Interim leader Mirziyoyev represented the presidential party, the O'zbekiston 
Liberal-demokratik Partiyasi. 
17 Official data on Turkmenistan’s 2007 presidential election reported a total turnout rate of 98.65% of 
eligible voters. Of these, 89.23 % voted for interim president G.M. Berdymukhammedov. Similar 
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figures as indicators of regime stability rather than as warning signs of the regime’s failure to 
guarantee the political rights of the wider electorate (Kaya & Bernhard 2013).  
The final element that needs to be analysed here to make sense of post-personalistic 
transitions in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan relates to the inauguration speeches that 
Berdymuhamedov and Mirziyoyev delivered after their electoral triumphs. As both 
campaigns were emptied of political content, inauguration speeches represented the earliest 
meaningful policy statement issued by the new leaders, if only because these speeches 
intended to introduce Central Asia’s second-generation leaders to the wider international 
community. 
A staunch commitment to uphold the policies of his predecessor represented the 
fundamental theme of Berdymukhammedov’s inaugural speech.18 The constraints imposed 
by his somewhat precarious power position led the new Turkmen president to outline a policy 
course firmly entrenched in the illusions underpinning the Niyazovist construct of the Altýn 
Asýr—an unprecedented Golden Age of peace and prosperity brought to the population by 
Turkmenistan’s post-Soviet leadership. To this end, Berdymukhammedov excluded any 
deviation from Niyazov’s policies, reaffirming his commitment to a set of social and 
economic measures that, by the end of the post-Niyazov transition, had substantially failed. A 
similar degree of lip-service to his predecessor’s policies pervaded Mirziyoyev’s 
inauguration speech.19 While this specific narrative characterised the early segments of the 
                                                 
figures (87.73% turnout rate; 88.61% of votes cast in favour of the interim president) characterised 
Uzbekistan’s presidential vote of December 2016. 
18 For the full text: “Rech’ Prezidenta Turkmenistana G.M. Berdymukhammedova” [Speech of G.M. 
Berdymukhammedov, President of Turkmenistan], Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, 25 February 2007, p. 1. 
19 For the full text: “Address by Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the joint session of the Chambers of Oliy Majlis 
dedicated to a Solemn Ceremony of Assuming the Post of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan” 
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speech—which almost tripled in length the one delivered by Berdymukhammedov in 2007—
its central and concluding passages introduced a detailed series of policy measures departing 
very visibly from the social and economic strategies of the prior regime. Mirziyoyev’s speech 
mentioned political liberalisation only in passim; the attention of Uzbekistan’s second 
president was therefore fixated on social and economic change, in anticipation of the many 
policies he endeavoured to introduce throughout 2017 and 2018.  
Specific focus on inauguration speeches adds a further complexity to the line of 
inquiry pursued here, inasmuch as it unveils the nexus between the successors’ positionality 
vis-à-vis the winning coalitions and the intensity of the policy de-personalisation drives 
introduced by second-generation leaders after their formal access to presidential powers. 
Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2016, 166) problematised this nexus, suggesting that, in 
transitional processes originated by the death of authoritarian leaders, weak successors or 
compromise candidates have little capacity to stimulate policy innovation, constrained as 
they usually are by the limitations imposed by entrenched élites. Testing their conclusions 
through exclusive focus on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is beyond the analytical scope of 
this article, which is nevertheless committed to delve into a specific facet of the nexus 
between power transfer and de-personalisation. 
The linkages between leadership succession and regime de-personalisation20 are 
understood here as being intimately connected with the (s)elected leaders’ capacity to 
                                                 
[https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/news/address-shavkat-mirziyoyev-joint-session-chambers-oliy-majlis-
dedicated-solemn-ceremony, accessed 14 February 2019].  
20 Abel Polese and his colleagues (2017) have related the durability of Turkmen authoritarianism to the 
regime’s capacity to establish a working cult of the leader’s personality, regardless of the leader’s 
identity or their personalistic tendencies. These scholars understood the 2006-2007 transition as an 
authoritarian continuum, wherein the post-Niyazov regime engaged in “as little restructuring as 
possible” to achieve its power preservation agenda (Polese, Ó Beacháin & Horák 2017, 440).  
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negotiate change with their supporting élites, imposing a return to forms of individual-ised, 
yet post-personalistic, decision-making. Personnel policy offers a very privileged point of 
view to discuss the processes whereby Berdymukhammedov and Mirziyoyev engaged with, 
or dismantled the fundamental constituents of, the élites inherited from their predecessors.  
 
Pathways to managed de-personalisation: Post-personalistic Personnel Policies in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
To identify regime pathways to élite de-personalisation in post-Niyazov Turkmenistan and 
post-Karimov Uzbekistan, this section showcases the results of a comprehensive study of 
biographies and career paths of the 79 cadres21 who rose to prominence in the initial two 
years22 of post-personalistic eras in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Table 1 lists the 43 
                                                 
The present article, conversely, located analytically transitions out of personalism at the intersection of 
two germane processes: de-personalisation and re-personalisation. The de-personalisation of Turkmen 
authoritarianism is in this sense understood as an outcome channelled through the de-Niyazovisation of 
the domestic political landscape. Whereas it recognises that a broader continuity in non-democratic 
governance methods has ultimately transcended Turkmenistan’s transition out of Niyazovism—
acknowledging in this sense the point advanced by Polese and his colleagues—this article is closer to 
the analytical framework outlined by Sébastien Peyrouse, for whom a clear, albeit short political 
moment—essentially coinciding with the first biennium of the Berdymukhammedov era—saw the 
regime in Ashgabat engaging in the “progressive erasure of the cult of Niyazov” (Peyrouse 2012, 117-
118). Eventually, a Berdymukhammedov-centric personality cult surfaced as part of a wider process, 
whereby the regime endeavoured to re-personalise the legitimacy agenda of Turkmen authoritarianism 
while maintaining a high degree of complementarity between the cults of the personalities of 
Turkmenistan’s two post-Soviet leaders (du Boulay & Isaacs 2018). 
21 The biographies of the surveyed élite members were collected from official sources: Neitral’nyi 
Turkmenistan and UzA, the official press agency of the Uzbek government.  
22 In the Turkmen case, the two-year period under observation began on 21 December 2006, the day of 
Berdymukhammedov’s appointment as interim leader. Yuldashev’s relinquishment of the interim 
leadership in favour of Mirziyoyev (8 September 2016) represented in turn the event selected as the 
starting point for the analysis of Uzbekistan’s post-personalistic personnel policies.  
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positions23—20 in Turkmenistan and 23 in Uzbekistan—investigated throughout the section, 
identifying the frequency of their reshuffles across the two timeframes in question.  
 
Please insert Table 1 HERE 
 
Élite de-personalisation is understood here as the process whereby post-personalistic leaders 
pursued the eradication of power centres that pivoted on established cadres and pre-existed 
the inauguration of second-generation presidencies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Three 
major observables are relevant to determine the scope of the de-personalisation strategies 
pursued by Berdymukhammedov and Mirziyoyev in the first two years of their presidencies: 
a) the élite turnover rate achieved throughout the two timeframes in question; b) the 
rejuvenation of the élites in power; and 3) the progressive reduction of their tenure. The latter 
two indicators, as noted in Table 2, are calculated at the endpoints of the intervals 
demarcating the chronological boundaries of this study. 
 
Please insert Table 2 HERE 
 
Mirziyoyev—who had accessed the presidency from within Uzbekistan’s winning 
coalition—achieved relatively comprehensive rates of élite de-personalisation. By 7 
September 2018, Uzbek cadres were generally younger and definitely less entrenched than 
those in post at the time of Karimov’s death. This picture is starkly different from that 
relative to the Turkmen context, where similar turnover rates failed to impact visibly on 
cadres’ in-post entrenchment and average age.  
                                                 
23 The final list of positions combines the posts occupied by members of the two winning coalitions 
with the larger range of positions associated with the outer élite groupings involved in the transitions’ 
ceremonial phases.  
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When analysed in light of average in-post tenure allowed by second-generation 
leaders, these turnover rates point to rather different de-personalisation drives, which did 
however depart from a similar origin: the reversal of the cadre management strategies 
implemented by Niyazov and Karimov. 
In the early stages of his presidency, Berdymukhammedov was not in a position to 
replicate the unpredictable personnel policies of his predecessor: it was therefore possible to 
impose frequent reshuffles upon a very limited range of positions (see Table 1). The Turkmen 
élite, as suggested in Table 2, became as a consequence more entrenched. Indicators relating 
to Uzbekistan’s de-personalisation pathway reveal in turn a more linear process, as 
Mirziyoyev wielded enough power to abandon the stability of cadres pursued by Karimov: 
over 24 months, Uzbekistan’s élite had become much less stable, as its average tenure in post 
was halved by the second-generation leader. Table 1 indicates that no fewer than 7 positions 
experienced one single alternation across the same timeframe, suggesting that Mirziyoyev, at 
least initially, trusted his own appointees. Multiple reshuffles were conversely imposed on 
three posts, including the governorship of the Samarkand region, which saw the removal of 
three governors between December 2016 and June 2018, when E.O. Turdimov was appointed 
at the helm of the regional hokimlik following the arrest of T.I. Dzhuraev on corruption 
charges.24  
The contours of the two de-personalisation strategies at play in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan become sharper when this study shifts its attention on professional backgrounds 
and individual profiles of the cadres reshuffled by Berdymukhammedov and Mirziyoyev.  
The élite turnover work carried out by the two leaders targeted specific pockets of 
positions, with the ultimate view to install loyalists in posts perceived as strategically vital for 
                                                 
24 “Eks-khokim Samarkandskoi oblasti i ego sotrudniki vyaty pod strazhu” [Former governor of 
Samarkand region and his associates taken into custody], Gazeta.uz, 13 June 2018.  
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post-personalistic consolidation. Post-Niyazov personnel policies promoted the 
precariousness of cadres presiding over Turkmenistan’s law-enforcement sector, as 
confirmed by the alternation of three presidents of the Turkmen supreme court and three 
interior ministers across the two years surveyed here. A very similar picture emerges from the 
Uzbek context, where all jobs linked with the state’s power sector—with the eminent 
exception of Uzbekistan’s constitutional court—were reshuffled during the first two years of 
the Mirziyoyev era (see Table 1).  
The timing of individual élite reshuffles unveils a further dimension to the two de-
personalisation drives. Figure 2 maps out chronologically the dismissals of the 20 cadres who 
were part of the élites at the time of Niyazov’s and Karimov’s death and were removed from 
their posts within the two timeframes considered in this study. The figure offers a spatial 
representation of the political significance of specific cadre dismissals, relating single 
instances of personnel removals to individual in-post tenure.25 
 
Please insert Figure 2 HERE 
 
There are two main immediate conclusions that can be drawn from Figure 2. To begin with, 
the two de-personalisation drives were carried out with greater intensity in the early stages of 
the post-personalistic eras: only three of the 20 dismissals surveyed here occurred in the latter 
half of the two timeframes in question. The figure does moreover identify the obliteration of 
the winning coalitions as integral to the de-personalisation pathways pursued in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. With the exception of Mirziyoyev, no member of either 
                                                 
25 Round data points indicate Turkmen élites; Uzbek cadres are represented through squares. Cadres’ 
positionality vis-à-vis their respective élites is captured graphically through the size of data points: 
winning coalition members are represented in the figure through large markers, while medium-size or 
small markers are used here to indicate the dismissals of ministers or marginal élite members 
respectively. 
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winning coalition was still in power by the end of the two-year periods surveyed here. 
Figure 2 also reinforces a series of previously advanced points about the emergence of 
diverging de-personalisation pathways in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. When related to pre-
transitional appointments, Berdymukhammedov’s de-personalisation drive involved a rather 
large group of cadres (14), who featured an average in-post tenure of 34 months at the time of 
their dismissal. Although low in absolute terms, these figures are significant when related to 
Niyazov’s personnel policies, which did not allow tenure entrenchment even at the highest 
élite levels. Figure 2 identifies seven cadres occupying politically significant posts at the time 
of their dismissal: five of these—the exceptions being Justice minister A.Zh. Gulgaraev and 
deputy Prime Minister Yu. G. Davudov—were amongst Turkmenistan’s ten most established 
élites at the moment of Niyazov’s death, at least in terms of in-post tenure. The figure 
suggests that post-Niyazov de-personalisation came to be operationalised via the replacement 
of the regime core: the winning coalition was substituted by a set of very established 
personnel—foreign minister R.O. Meredov and long-term Presidential Administration 
members V.M. Khramov and Y.O. Paromov—joined by former presidential hopeful A. 
Mammetgeldiyev, who rose to prominence in the early Berdymukhammedov era by offering 
the support of Turkmenistan’s power structures to the new leader.26 Cadre redistribution was 
a marginal element in the de-personalisation of the Turkmen élites: with two notable 
exceptions,27 dismissals from central and peripheral posts indicate definitive exit from 
Turkmenistan’s post-personalistic regime. 
                                                 
26 “Turkmen Security Chief Ousted”, Gündogar, 17 May 2007, available at: 
http://gundogar.org/?0220044318000000000000013000000, accessed 20 February 2019.  
27 These referred to D.N. Orazov, who rose to the ranks of deputy chairman of the Turkmen Cabinet 
from his role of governor of Ashgabat city in August 2008, and Supreme Court Chairman C. 
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The limited number of Uzbek cadres surveyed in the figure suggests that Mirziyoyev, 
at least during the early stages of his presidency, selected a pathway to de-personalisation 
centred on the redistribution of Karimov-era appointees, rather than on their ultimate removal 
from the Uzbek élites.28 Personnel re-distribution had an immediate effect, namely the 
lowering of in-post tenure. Exclusions were limited to extremely established cadres, 
especially winning coalition members Inoyatov and Azimov. Their removal contributed 
decisively to élite rejuvenation: the dismissal of the six cadres featured in Figure 2 decreased 
by 50% the number of Uzbek élites born in the 1940s and in power on 7 September 2018.  
The tables and the figure included in this segment finally reveal that the de-
personalisation drives carried out in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan remain significant but 
were by no means all-encompassing. The regimes’ explicit focus on a wider range of 
relatively second-tier cadres (Turkmenistan) or a smaller number of very powerful élite 
members (Uzbekistan) capture on the one hand the emergence of de-personalisation trends in 
both contexts, failing to highlight on the other the consolidation of cadre management 
strategies seeking the rapid and systematic elimination of the new leaders’ political rivals. 
As it offered an empirical picture departing from the chaotic characterisation of de-
personalisation retrievable from the extant literature (Geddes 1999; Ulfelder 2005), this 
segment identifies in this sense a further factor to explain the stability defining post-
personalistic regime evolution in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Through a very similar 
strategy, namely managed de-personalisation, the new leaders—who, as we have seen earlier, 
                                                 
Khodhamyradov, who was appointed as Turkmenistan’s Prosecutor General in July 2007, to be 
eventually dismissed on 3 March 2008. 
28 Out of the 23 cadres in power at the time of Karimov’s death, 10 remained in power throughout the 
timeframe surveyed here, while 4 were transferred to other jobs. The list also included two positions 
that were elective and one honorary post with no replacement possible.  
 32 
rose to power from different positions of influence—avoided élite upheaval in the short term, 
sowing the seeds for enhanced regime durability in both contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
In approaching comparatively transitions out of established personalistic rule in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, this article has identified the key mechanisms through which 
élite collectives shaped succession dynamics in regime environments traditionally sustained 
by the influence of an individual political actor. 
The first key conclusion that can be drawn from the research showcased here relates 
to the overall sense of stability that pervaded post-personalistic transfers of power in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The materialisation of temporary, informal structures of 
collective decision-making and the contemporaneous re-emergence of authoritarian tools 
tested in the Soviet era facilitated the codification of a succession praxis for Central Asia’s 
two personalist regimes. This praxis, inaugurated in Turkmenistan and perfected a decade 
later in Uzbekistan, ensured the authoritarian resilience of regimes that, throughout sustained 
timeframes, categorically refused to adopt strategies of pre-arranged political succession. By 
systematising the politics of power transfer in post-personalistic Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, this article also demonstrated that Central Asia’s mechanisms of regime 
preservation defeated any prediction of instability by working through ostensibly non-
organised processes of leadership change. The systematisation of these mechanisms may 
prove useful to tackle analytically the next wave of post-personalistic transitions to be 
completed in the relative short term (Tajikistan) or a later stage (Russia, Belarus) across post-
Soviet Eurasia, should these occur without the appointment of designated successors to E. 
Rahmon, V.V. Putin and A.G. Lukashenka respectively.  
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Beyond facilitating the identification of the élite collectives that managed the 
transitions out of first presidencies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the article’s focus on the 
agency of post-personalistic power transfers has unveiled the options available to designated 
successors to de-personalise cadre management in their respective political landscapes. The 
leaders’ different attitudes to non-democratic de-personalisation—very visible in Uzbekistan, 
relatively oblique in Turkmenistan in the early Berdymukhammedov years—were explained 
through the prism of the leaders’ different power positions in the personalistic regimes. Élite 
centrality at a time of a leader’s death was therefore illustrated here as a reliable predictor of 
a post-personalistic leader’s capacity to rapidly access de-personalisation tools.  
Does short-term de-personalisation lead to regime re-personalisation in the long run? 
The paper’s focus on early post-personalistic politics in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
revealed a series of factors that contributed decisively to the eventual personalisation of the 
Berdymukhammedov regime and highlighted a few instances of the emergence of embryonic 
forms of personalistic decision-making in post-Karimov Uzbekistan. Future research may 
build upon the argument presented here to explain these dynamics in a comparative, long-
term perspective.  
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